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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF
DEATH-STOCK DIVIDENDS
In the case of Estate of McGehee v. Commissioner, 28 T. C. 412 the Tax
Court was faced with the recurrent problem of deciding the nature of a stock
dividend. This time the court had to pass on a facet of that problem not touched
upon in previous decisions; 1 i.e., whether a stock dividend, declared after an
absolute gift of the original shares, should be included in the gross estate of
the deceased donor for purposes of computing the Federal Estate Tax.
The deceased Delia McGehee, prior to her death in 1950,2 transferred to her
husband in several installments, shares of stock in a Florida corporation. The
transfers took place during the years 1947-1949. The corporation whose stock
was transferred followed the practice of capitalizing its earnings and pro rata
issuing stock dividends. Both the Commissioner and the estate agreed that
the gifts to the husband were given in contemplation of death and therefore to
be included in the gro~s estate. But the Commissioner and the estate disagreed
on the includibility of the stock dividends.
In 1948 the corporation issued a stock dividend on the shares transferred
to the husband in 1947. In 1949 the corporation declared another stock divi-
dend on the shares transferred in 1947 and on those transferred in 1948. The
issue raised by the parties was whether these stock dividends, which principally
represented capitalization of the corporation's earnings subsequent to the trans-
fers should be included in the decedent's gross estate.
The court, agreeing with the Commissioner, held that the shares of stock
distributed as a stock dividend are includible in the gross estate of the transferor.
Four members of the court dissented on this one issue in question.'
The court said that the problem, very narrowly stated, ". . . is to deter-
mine just what was transferred-was it simply the shares of stock originally
transferred--or was it the proportional share in the entire assets, business and
affairs of the corporation which those certificates represented ?" In answering
the issue as they defined it, the court said, ". . . the gross estate would encom-
1 The estate did cite an English case involving similar facts and statute, where the court reached
a result different from the decision reached here. Attorney General v. Oldham [1940] 1 K.B.
599, aff'd, [1940] 3 All E.R. 450.
2 The date of decedent's death causes the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to be applicable.
3 There was another issue raised concerning the marital deduction and terminable interests, but
as this was raised under the decedent's will the scope of this note will be limited to the problem
of the gross estate and the inter vivos gift to the husband.
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pass the value of the proportionate interest in the corporation represented by
the shares originally transferred just as if that interest had been held by the de-
cedent up to the time of death; and this in turn would include the value of the
shares received as stock dividends." (Emphasis added.)
Primarily it will be the purpose of this paper to discuss the proportional
interest rule which is the basis of the majority opinion in the instant case. This
rule had been proposed to the courts previously by the taxing agencies of the
federal government but with little success. The McGehee case appears to be a
departure from a previous pattern of the courts.
The section of the Code applicable here concerns those interests which
the transferor parted with completely, both ". . by trust or otherwise". The
donor in the McGehee case gave the stock to her husband absolutely, retaining
no interest or privileges whatsoever.
The Tax Court split in their efforts to define the issue here involved.
Ultimately the line of demarcation between the majority and the minority
opinion is that the majority say the question is: what is the proportionate interest
that passed, while the minority say the issue is: what is the value of the interest
that was transferred at the time of the gift. The majority opinion defends itself
by saying that the problem of valuing the interest transferred arises only after
a determination of the quantum.
It is suggested that reference to the Code and cases decided under it would
indicate that the legislative intent was to avoid such "open-end" methods of
evaluation as adopted by the majority. The Code expressly states that stock
market quotations are to be used where available and when not, evaluation is
to be made by comparison with similar corporations for which quotations are
available. This leads us to the conclusion that the proportional interest rule
4
INT. REV. CODE, § 811 (c) (1) (A), 53 STAT. 120 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2035).
Section 811 Gross Estate.
The value of the gross estate of decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except
real property outside of the United States-
(c) Transfers in Contemplation of, or Taking Effect at, Death-
(1) General Rule.-To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise-
(A) In contemplation of death; . . .
6 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 811 (k), 53 STAT. 71 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2031 (b)).
Section 811 (k) Valuation of unlisted stock and securities. In the case of stock and securities
of a corporation the value of which by reason of the absence of sales thereof, cannot be determined
with reference to sale prices, the value thereof shall be determined by taking into consideration, in
addition to all other factors, the value of stock or securities of corporations engaged in the same
or a similar line of business which are listed on the exchange.
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should not be applied because this term denotes a "book-value" evaluation-a
value which most frequently is at a wide divergence from market quotations.7
The ruling of the McGehee case lumps together in the estate of the de-
cedent the principal of the gift res and its accumulations, citing as its authority
Eisner v. Macomber.8 There the question before the Supreme Court was whether
stock dividends were taxable as income. The answer of the Court in that case
was that the particular stock dividend involved was not taxable as income. The
reasoning of the decision was that stock dividends are not income when the
corporate structure is not changed by issuance of the stock but rather represent
a bookkeeping entry made to shift monies from an undivided surplus account
to a capital account with a pro rata issuance of shares representing the capital-
ized surplus. But in the McGehee case the capitalized surplus resulted from
profits accruing principally after the transfer and therefore the issuing of shares
to the donee represented more than just a bookkeeping entry when viewed in
respect to -the original transaction, i.e., the transfer to the husband, which is
what the Code directs to be the crucial event for purposes of the federal estate
tax.
Eisner v. Macomber can readily be distinguished from the McGehee case
on two grounds. First, on the basis that the former was concerned with taxable
income under federal income tax statutes; and secondly, in Eisner v. Macomber
the Court was concerned with stock in the hands of one owner while in the
McGehee case a tranfer to a second owner-donee is involved. Eisner v. Ma-
comber pointed out that the issuance of a stock dividend does not add anything
of value to the assets of the stockholder; however the decision does not say
that subsequent earned surplus, capitalization of same, and issuance of stock
dividends thereon, does not add to the holdings of the transferee of the original
stockholder when compared to what the original stockholder possessed.
6 Concededly "book value" has been used for evaluation of stock holdings in a decedent's
estate. See Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F. 2d 270 (8th Cir. 1935). But see Colonial Trust Co. v.
Kraemer, 63 F.Supp. 866 (D.C. Conn. 1945) where "book value" was denied as a proper basis
for evaluating shares. The decisions of the cases in this area indicate that "book value" frequently
is taken into consideration with other factors; but only in cases where there are no quotations
available or where sales are for nominal prices among members of a family will "book value" be
resorted to exclusively.
PATON, ESSENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 700 (Rev. ed. 1949).
8 252 U.S. 189 (1919) The Court there said that the declaration of a stock dividend
is no more than a book adjustment, in essence not a dividend but rather the opposite; no part of
the assets of the company is separated from the common fund, nothing distributed except paper
certificates that evidence an antecedent increase in the value of the stockholders capital interest
resulting from an accumulation of profits by the company; . . . (A] charge is made against surplus
account with corresponding credit to the capital stock account, equal to the proposed dividend; the
new stock is issued against this and the certificates delivered to the existing sockholders in propor-
tion to their previous holdings."
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In Koshland v. Helvering ' which was decided after Eisner v. Macomber
the Supreme Court expressly recognized the divisibility between stock and
stock dividends when they stated that even though dividends be paid out in
shares of the issuing corporation and represent capitalization of earnings, such
dividends may be income where the new shares give the stockholder an interest
different in character from that represented by his previous holding. It is
suggested that there is a basis for arguing that the profits which eventuated
the stock dividends in the McGehee case created "an interest different in char-
acter" from that held by the original owner, and therefore Eisner v. Macomber
does not apply.
By reference to other sections of the Code, the McGehee case appears to
be somewhat anomalous. The Code provides that the estate of the deceased
may be valued as of the date of death or one year thereafter.1° Under this alter-
nate evaluation section of the Code the Commissioner first put forth his pro-
portionate interest argument. The case of Maass v. Higgins " raised the ques-
tion of whether rents, dividends and interest payments which had accrued and
were paid during the interval between the date of death and the optional
valuation date should be included in the gross estate when the executor chose
the latter date. The Commissioner argued that these were to be included in
the estate because ". . . for purposes of estate tax valuation, the assets
consist of two elements,-one, the right of ownership, the other, the right to
receive income. It is said both these elements enter into the valuation made as
of the date of death and if, in the subsequent period, the latter emerges in the
shape of a payment, that payment is to be attributable to the right of ownership
of the income producing property." 12
The Supreme Court rejected this argument saying that regardless of the
choice of date for valuation purposes the method of valuation shall be the
sale price of the security on the particular date chosen and any interest or
dividend accrued as of the date of death of the deceased. Thus the court
excluded the dividends accrued and paid during the one year interval. Note
also, that here again the Court recognizes the separateness of capital and its
accretions-and that it sets out market price as the criterion for the determining
value of a security.
9298 U.S. 189 (1936) accord, Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Helvering v.
Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937).
These cases are distinguishable from Eisner v. Macombher in that here the original stock held
was preferred, and common stock dividends were issued.
10 INT. REV. CODE of 1939 § 811 (j), 53 STAT. 122 (now INT. REV, CODE of 1954 § 2032).
1"1 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
12 Id. at 447.
1958.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In the regulations issued after the decision in Maass v. Higgins, the Com-
missioner specifically provided that "ordinary" stock dividends declared after
the date of a decedent's death are not included in the value of the gross estate
when using the anniversary date as the date of valuation.1" It is significant
also that in these same regulations cash and stock dividends are grouped to-
gether-the regulations making no distinction as was done in the McGehee
case.
The pertinent section of the Code dealing with "Gifts in Contemplation
of Death" acts retroactively to reach the original transaction, i.e., the transfer by
the deceased, but in its march backward its operation is not to sweep into its
grasp subsequent accumulations to the transferred property. The basis for
this contention is that line.of trust cases in this area which hold income to the
trust or property bought with such income are not to be included in the gross
estate, unless the settlor retained a power over or interest in such income.
The second attempt of the Commissioner to impose a proportional in-
terest rule came in one of these trust cases. The case of Commissioner v. Gid-
witz 1 involved a situation where the deceased settlor established an irrevocable
trust naming his wife and sons as beneficiaries. The entire corpus consisted
of shares of stock in one corporation. The trust provided for the accumulation
of income during the settlor's life. At the time the trust was created the stock
had a value of approximately $55,000. At the death of the settlor the entire
trust fund was valued at approximately $340,000. The original shares had a
value of approximately $140,000. The difference represented the value of
accrued income and property purchased for the trust with the accumulated in-
come. The Commissioner argued that the trust income should be included
in the gross estate because ". . . the valuation of the gross estate should in-
clude all income received by the trust prior to the decedent's death on the theory
that the property transferred to the trust in 1936 included not only the owner-
ship of the 831/ (the original corpus) shares of stock but also a separate prop-
erty right to receive the income on the stock." 15 The Commissioner further
contended that the value of the right to receive income was measured by the
income accumulated by the trust.
The circuit court in answering this line of argument said that regardless
of the reach of the statute to include an inter vivos trust created in contempla-
13 Estate Tax Reg. 105 § 81.11 (4). See also Proposed Estate Tax Reg. No. 20. 2032 (iv).
"Ordinary" is used here to distinguish those dividends which are the result of liquidation
of capital assets, which assets had been represented in the original shares. Such dividends are
classified as extraordinary and therefore includible in the gross estate.
14 196 F.2d 813 (1952).
15 Id. at 817.
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tion of death, trust income and property purchased therewith were outside of
the statute for purposes of computing the gross estate. The court pointed out
that the trust was irrevocable and that the deceased settlor reserved no right
to have any of the income paid to him. The income, said the court, was the
property of the trust and not that of the settlor.
It is suggested that for purposes of computing the gross estate there should
be no distinction between a trust accruing income and making investments
therewith, and a corporation investing their own profits in their own corporation
and issuing shares of stock as evidence of such investment.
A recent case which would appear to be pertinent is Commissioner v.
McDermott.6  There again the situation was an irrevocable inter vivos trust.
The settlor named himself as trustee with the power to accelerate the trust
benefits to the beneficiaries. The settlor was not a beneficiary nor could he en-
croach upon the trust corpus for his own use. The trust instrument provided
for accumulation of the income. Income was accumulated and added to the
trust corpus.
The Commissioner argued that the interest transferred by the deceased
settlor included the income accumulated 'by the trust because of the power to
modify the trust terms. The circuit court ruled that the value of the original
corpus only and not the resultant income should be included in the gross estate.
The court said the mere possibility of control in certain situations was not suffi-
cient to cause the accumulations to be included in the gross estate of the de-
ceased settlor-trustee.
The facts in the McDermott case when compared to those in the McGehee
case were even more favorable to the Commissioner since in the former, .the
settlor had some power over the accumulations to the transferred property,
while in the McGehee case the donor had no control over the property trans-
ferred or its accumulations. The apparent inconsistency of the decisions can
be explained in how the two forums defined the issues. The court in the
McDermott case took a strong stand on the issue of property transferred and
that not transferred.
"Whether the trust agreement comes within the sweep of an enumerated con-
tingency is immaterial unless the property sought to be taxed at decedent's death
was included in the property transferred at the time of the creation of the
trust. Irrespective of all other considerations, property to be includible
must have been transferred." 17
16 222 F.2d 665 (1955). It is noteworthy in this discussion that the entire corpus in the
McDermott case was 800 shares of one issue of stock and the accumulation in question was one
dividend.
17 Id. at 668. accord, Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (1949)
1-958.1
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It is suggested that there should be no distinction between accumulations
to stock transferred in a gift situation and accumulations to an inter vivos trust.
This should be more emphatically true considering the circuit court's refusal
to include resultant income in the gross estate, even though there was an ele-
ment of control over such income.
An additional problem created by the McGehee case is that a literal inter-
pretation of the court's language could possibly be construed to mean that gifts
given in contemplation of death should receive the same tax treatment as
transfers taking effect at death. Quoting again from the majority opinion,
it was said that, ". . . the gross estate would encompass the value of the pro-
portional interest in the corporation represented by the shares originally trans-
ferred just as if that interest had been held by the decedent up to the time of
death; and this in turn would include the value of the shares received as stock
dividends." (Emphasis added.)
The various Internal Revenue Codes 1' have drawn an explicit distinction
between these two types of transfers and have taxed each on a separate basis.
Along with this the courts in the past have srtuck down any attempts to obliterate
the dichotomy.19
It should be noted that in the instant case, the learned judges, in support
of their viewpoint, cite language from Igleheart v. Commissioner."0 It is
respectfully submitted that neither this case nor the language used therein is
apropos to the issue at hand. The court was there deciding whether the date
of death was the correct valuation date and not whether accumulations to prop-
erty transferred should be included in the gross estate. The precise paragraph
of the Igleheart case used by the court here to support their decision is, in fact,
authority for a directly opposite result:
"The thing taxed is the transmission of property from the dead to the living.
For the purposes of the tax, property transferred by the decedent *in con-
templation of death is in the same category as it would have been if the
transfer had not been and the transferred property had continued to be owned
by the decedent up to the time of his death. As to the property so trans-
ferred as 'well as to property owned by the decedent at the time of his death,
the measure of the tax is the value of that property at the time of decedent's
death." (Emphasis added.) 21
is Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 811 (c) (1) (A) in contemplation of his death; or § 811 (c) (1)
(C) intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. This dichotomy is
retained in the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 2035 and 2037.
19 Commissioner v. Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 at 818 (1952).
20 77 F.2d 704 (5 Cir. 1935) at 711.
21 In all fairness to the Tax Court it should be noted that in citing a segment from the above
quoted paragraph, they say, "Though the case is not directly in point this view (proportional interest
rule) finds support in the language used by the Court of Appeals in Igleheart v. Commissioner."
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It is suggested that a proportionate interest rule be applied only in cases
where stock dividends are the result of stock splitting, because such financial
manipulations are as the court said a mere fractionating of the static segment
of the proprietary rights. "2 But when stock dividends are the dynamic result
of earnings subsequent to a transfer in contemplation of death, such dividends
should not be included in the gross estate. 3
The silence of the statute concerning income and accumulations to property
transferred without retained interest or powers, has confounded taxpayer and
collector alike. The resultant litigation in this area could be reduced if the
legislature would explicitly set out the law regarding this type of transfer.24
The McGehee case appears to depart from a pattern of reluctance on the
part of the courts to "legislate by judicial fiat." 2 It would be appropriate to
conclude this note with a quotation from Burns v. Commissioner where the
Circuit Court of Appeals was discussing the same applicable sections of the
Code which were applied in the McGehee case.
"The tax statute in question should be strictly construed in favor of the
taxpayer, and since it does not expressly provide for the inclusion of income
derived from the transferred property in the gross estate, it is not our pre-
rogative to legislate by judicial fiat to give it that effect." 26
JOHN C. SULLIVAN.
22 See 54 HARV. L. REV. 512.
23 See Justice Withey's dissent in the principal case where he concedes that some portion of
the capitalized profits might have been in existence at the time of transfer in which case he would
include this amount in the gross estate of the deceased. He also called attention to the fact that
after the issuance of the stock dividends the new stock was of the same value as the original shares
which indicates he says new and additional capital.
24 The need for legislation in this area is greater than ever due to changes in the federal income
tax laws. See Bittker, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1955) where he points
out that for income tax purposes inherited property takes as its basis in the hands of the heir its
value as of the decedent's death. Under the 1939 Code section 113(a) (5) only such property
"acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance", was includible but now under section 1014 of the
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 the scope of the statute has been expanded to include gifts in contemplation
of death.
25 Accord, Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (1949); Commissioner v. McDermott, 222
F.2d 665 (1955); Attorney General v. Oldham, [1940) 1 K.B. 599 aff'd [1940) 3 All E.R. 450.
26 Id. Burns v. Commissioner at 741.
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